Thinking about a referral fee? Think “fee sharing” instead.

Every now and then lawyers make comments that remind me that there are common misconceptions about some of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct.  In turn, the reminders remind me to send out reminders. 

Here’s a reminder on referral fees: as I read Vermont’s rules, straight referral fees are prohibited.

First, V.R.Pr.C. 7.2(b) prohibits a lawyer from “giving anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services.”  While paragraph (b)(4) authorizes lawyers to make referrals and enter into reciprocal referral arrangements, Comment [8] states that:

  • “[e]xcept as provided in Rule 1.5(e), a lawyer who receives referrals from a lawyer or nonlawyer must not pay anything solely for the referral . . .” (emphasis added).

That’s not necessarily the end.

V.R.Pr.C. 1.5(e) authorizes lawyers who are not in the same firm to share fees if certain requirements are met.  Two requirements are simple:

  • The overall fee must be reasonable; and,
  • The client must agree in writing to the division of the fee.

The final requirement is a bit trickier, but not too difficult.  Fee sharing is only allowed:

  • in proportion to the services that each lawyer performs, OR,
  • each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation.

With respect to the latter, here’s Comment [7] is instructive and includes this statement:

  • “Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership.”

In April 2016, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 474.  The opinion reaches the same conclusion about the Model Rule as I have about Vermont’s and also endeavors to shed some light on “joint responsibility for the representation.”  The ABA Journal summarized Formal Opinion 474 here.

Finally, Comment [8] clarifies that the rule “does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm.”

As always, let’s be careful out there.

Related Posts:

Bartering for Legal Fees

This post might not be relevant to many readers. However, I’m writing because my sense is that it is not uncommon for attorneys in Vermont’s smaller firms and towns to barter with clients.

Last week, in a case involving a lawyer who bartered a fee for legal services, a disciplinary panel in Maine reprimanded the lawyer for violating the rule that governs business transactions with clients.  The Legal Profession Blog reported the decision, which is here:

So I’m clear, nothing in the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits bartering for a legal fee. However, the Maine decision is a good reminder that bartering often equates to a different type of transaction than does negotiating a standard fee agreement.  TA type of business transaction that invokes one of the conflicts rules.

In the Maine case, the client was not able to pay the lawyer’s hourly fee. So, the lawyer and client agreed that the client would pay for legal services by transferring title to a car to the lawyer, giving the lawyer a note and mortgage interest in real estate, and doing some excavation work for the lawyer.  The lawyer was sanctioned for (admittedly) failing to comply with Maine’s rule that governs business transactions with a client.

In Vermont, Rule 1.8 applies to such situations.  Here’s paragraph (a):

“A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless

(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;

(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and

(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.”

Comment [1] indicates that the rule is meant to address “the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transactions or a lawyer investment on behalf of the client.”  It adds that the rule “does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between lawyer and client, which are governed by Rule 1.5[1], although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of the fee.”

Now, some might be wondering “why isn’t this in the rule on fees?”  It is — kind of.  Again, Rule 1.5 prohibits unreasonable fees. Comment [4] allows a lawyer to “accept property in payment for services.”  However, the Comment goes on to caution that “a fee paid in property may be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a) because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.”

In short, when bartering for a legal fee, remember that the rule on business transactions with a client might apply.

As always, let’s be careful out there.

[1] V.R.Pr.C. 1.5 prohibits unreasonable fees.

Vermont’s Rules on Handling Flat Fees Paid in Advance of Services Being Provided. With some wellness thrown in.

This post will eventually address Vermont’s rules on handling flat fees that are paid in advance of any legal services being provided.  First, however, I’ll share some thoughts on billing and wellness.

I’ll say again what I’ve said before: I’m a fan of the recommendations made by the Legal Employers Committee in the State Action Plan that the Vermont Commission on the Well-Being of the Legal Profession issued in 2018.  Outlined on page 11 and beginning in full on page 68, the committee’s recommendations provide fantastic and prescient tips for legal employers, both public and private, interested in improving the profession’s wellness.  A few months ago, I posted this endorsement of the committee’s recommendation that employers allow staff to set communication boundaries with clients and opposing counsel.

Another of the committee’s recommendations addressed billable hours.

  • “In firms that impose billable hour quotas on attorneys, assess whether and how that quota system may be contributing to unproductive competition, excessive stress, and unhealthy work habits. In large firms, an anonymous survey may be the best way to assess this issue. In smaller firms, it can be done through simple observation. If a quota system appears to be encouraging unhealthy behavior and excessive stress, modify it, eliminate it, or consider alternatives.”

That the billable hour impacts wellness is not news. In 2011, the State Bar of Michigan posted The Billable Hour and Lawyer Wellness.  Responding to the argument that the billable hour is unhealthy in and of itself, the author wrote:

  • “It is not. At its root, the problem is one of wellness. Unhealthy lawyers create and perpetuate unhealthy systems. Put simply, the way a healthy lawyer relates to billable hours is much different from the way an unhealthy lawyer does.”

More recently, Law.Com addressed the billable hour’s impact on associates’ health, Above The Law highlighted one large law firm’s attempt to improve work-life balance by reducing the billable hour requirement, and Attorney At Law warned that encouraging/providing vacations means nothing absent a reduction in billable hours.

One alternative to hourly billing is a flat fee.

Again, today’s focus is on how to handle flat fees.  Still, for anyone considering the model, Clio has 5 Ways Flat Fee Attorneys More and How To Determine The Price Of Flat Fee Legal Services.  Meanwhile, Attorney at Work has Flat Fee or Hourly? Pros and Cons of Lawyer Billing Options.

So, you’ve decided to use flat fees.  Consider:

  • Mike Kennedy retains you. You agree to handle Mike’s matter for $ X. Prior to you doing any work, Mike advances $ X.

Now what?

At the beginning of this post, I promised eventually to address Vermont’s rule. Well, since then I got distracted and am only now back to fulfill my promise.  Alas, in the interests of time and needing to run to the store to get some half & half for this morning’s coffee[1], I’ll resort to an old blogger’s trick:  here’s my post on how to handle flat fees that are paid in advance of services being provided.

As always, be careful out there.

Dollar Sign

[1] Jennifer & Laura: the carton says “October 27.”  You know how I am.

Contingent Fee: $18,500 per hour?

I continue to struggle to find the motivation to blog.  My malaise bugs me.  Rather than dwell on it, this morning I decided to rid myself of it.  My plan is simple: find an interesting story and figure out a way to tie it Vermont legal ethics and write about them.  Then, do it again a few days later. So, here goes.

Earlier this week, the ABA Journal posted Quinn Emanuel seeks fee amounting to $18,500 per hour; will judge approve it?  Quinn Emanuel is a law firm.  The firm represented a class of health care insurers that sued the federal government.  Bloomberg Law posted the firm’s motion to have its fee approved.  The motion’s introductory paragraph sets the stage better than I can:

  • “In February 2016, Quinn Emanuel became the first firm in the nation to file a lawsuit on behalf of a Qualified Health Plan issuer against the federal government alleging that the government improperly failed to make risk corridor payments in violation of Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act. Four years later, following round after round of fierce litigation and a loss at the Federal Circuit, eight justices of the Supreme Court adopted the exact legal theory Quinn Emanuel set forth in the initial Health Republic complaint and which it advocated at every step, including in the parallel cases that eventually made their way to the Supreme Court. The result? An entire industry was able to collect three years’ worth of unpaid risk corridors amounts they had previously been forced to write off as a total loss—approximately $12 billion. Nearly $4 billion of that recovery will go to the class members in these class actions.”

Cutting to the chase, years ago, the firm notified class members that it would ask a court to approve a fee equal to 5% of any recovery.  Here, 5% of $3.7 billion is $185 million. Per the ABA Journal, that “translates to a whopping hourly fee of about $18,500.”

It’s not my point today to comment on the Quinn Emanuel case.  Rather, I’m using it as click bait to provide a refresher on contingent fee agreements.

Rule 1.5(a) prohibits lawyers from agreeing to, charging, or collecting unreasonable fees and expenses.  Contingent fees, and expenses in contingent fee cases, are subject to the rule.

A contingent fee agreement MUST be in a writing that is signed by the client.  In Vermont, the failure to reduce a contingent fee in writing has resulted in lawyers being reprimanded and admonished.  Tip: do this at the outset of the representation.

In addition, Rule 1.5(c) states that a contingent fee agreement MUST:

  • state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including:
    • the percentage that will accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial, or appeal;
    • the litigation & other expenses that will be deducted from any recovery; and,
    • whether such expenses will be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.
  • clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the client is the prevailing party.

Upon the conclusion of a contingent fee matter, a lawyer:

  • MUST provide the client with a written statement showing the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, the remittance to the client and the method by which it was determined.

Lawyers are NOT allowed to agree to, charge, or collect:

  • a contingent fee in a criminal case;
  • a fee that is contingent upon the securing of a divorce; or,
  • a fee that is contingent upon the amount of spousal maintenance or support, or property settlement in lieu thereof, in a domestic relations matter.

However, lawyers may use contingent fees in domestic relations matters that involve the collection of:

  • spousal maintenance or support due AFTER a final judgment has been entered; or,
  • child support and maintenance arrearages due AFTER a final judgment has been entered, provided that the court approves the reasonableness of the fee agreement.

In other words, contingent fees are okay in some POST-JUDGMENT divorce & custody matters.

Finally, two cautionary tales.

First, in this post, I referenced a case in which a contingent fee agreement called for a firm to receive 40% of any recovery.  It also included this provision:

  • “Should [Client] refuse to make any settlement which my attorneys advise me is reasonable and should be taken, then I understand that I am responsible for their fee on the basis of that offer, unless they waive this provision.”

Sure enough, the client rejected a settlement offer that the firm advised the client to accept. The firm withdrew and, pursuant to the clause, sought its fee. The Tennessee Supreme Court publicly reprimanded the lawyers, concluding that the settlement provision chilled the client’s right to decide whether to settle.

Second, the failure to reduce to a fee agreement to writing can result in more than a disciplinary sanction.  As the ABA Journal reported here – in a case in which the client was Johnny Depp – a contract for attorney’s fees can be voided if not reduced to writing.

I’ve blogged.  With that weight lifted, off to do what I never lack the motivation to do: get some miles in on a sunny day.  Enjoy the weekend!

Dollar Sign

Quality Work Won’t Excuse An Excessive Fee

Last week, the New Jersey Supreme Court disbarred an attorney who charged an excessive fee and engaged in fraudulent and deceptive billing practices.  The ABA Journal reported the story here.  The Court’s disbarment order is here.

The Court’s order adopted this recommendation from the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board.  In my view, the Board’s recommendation includes valuable tips.

Rule 1.5(a) of the Vermont Rules of Professional Conduct states that “a lawyer shall not make an arrangement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount of expenses.”  We do not have many reported disciplinary decisions involving unreasonable or excessive fees.  The most recent is this one.

Indeed, we do not receive many fee complaints.  And, when we do, most of them are garden variety fee disputes that, as authorized by the rules that govern the Professional Responsibility Program, we refer to the Vermont Bar Association’s Committee for the Arbitration of Fee Complaints.

The New Jersey case was far more serious than a “garden variety fee dispute.”

The client hired the respondent to represent her in her capacity as the executrix of her husband’s estate.  Three initial points:

  1. Respondent billed the client “674 hours, for a total fee of $120,275.25, of which she paid $88,199.68.”
  2. The client fired the respondent.  New counsel began from scratch and completed the work for a total of $12,912.50.
  3. At the disciplinary hearing, an expert testified that he would have completed the work for no more than $15,500.

Some key lessons from the opinion:

  • The respondent argued that his work netted the client a significant tax savings.  The Board responded: “The bulk of respondent’s defense was that it was critical for him to eliminate the $23,243 in New Jersey estate taxes, but he ignored the fact that he billed the estate almost six times the amount of the tax savings ($120,275.25).”

I’ve not seen anything that extreme.  But, be wary: charging $X for a client to recover significantly less than $X could easily get a lawyer into hot water.

  • The respondent argued that his billing records were accurate and that the work he did was of good quality.  Nobody disagreed.  Not the disciplinary prosecutor, not the Disciplinary Review Board. However, ss the Board stated:
    • “Respondent failed or refused, at every turn, to understand the issue in this
      case. His lack of understanding is illustrated by his statement that he would have been sued for malpractice if he had not provided the services he did. Although the [disciplinary prosecutor] had stipulated that the quality of respondent’s services was not in question, when respondent was repeatedly confronted with the fact that he was not defending the actual charges, he simply replied that he was merely proving that he did the work.”

Billing for work that isn’t necessary is unethical.  It’s a violation of the rule that prohibits unreasonable fees.  In addition, as the NJ Board noted, clients are entitled to assume that their lawyers will not charge them for work that is not required and has no bearing on the objective of the representation.  When such “overreaching” demonstrates “a significant disconnect between the amount of work reasonably necessary to resolve a client’s matter and the amount billed,” it’s deceptive and fraudulent.

  • A chunk of the bill was for time spent getting up-to-speed on “ancillary probate issues” that arose, of all places, in Vermont.  The Board concluded that, in and of itself, charging to learn the law isn’t unethical per se.  But when the entire matter could’ve been done for $15,000, charging $23,000 to “educate himself at the expense of the client . . . is both unethical and fraudulent.”

Be careful how much you charge to get up to speed on a client’s matter.

In closing, anyone who has ever heard me speak on Rule 1.5 and issues related to billing has heard me clearly state that “it is not unethical to charge your clients.”  My tips:

  • at the outset, tell clients what you will charge;
  • at the outset, give clients a reasonable expectation of how much time the matter will take; and,
  • send regular invoices.

In other words, treat your clients the same way you’d want to be treated by someone you hire to do something for you.

Finally, don’t assume that “if a client complains, the worst case will be fee arbitration.” While it hasn’t happened in a long time, one of these days, the worst case will be, quite literally, the worst case.  And worst cases usually result in disciplinary sanctions.

Dollar Sign



An Improper Contingent Fee

I’ve used the past few Tuesdays to post on trust accounting.  I’m going off script today to call attention to a disciplinary case that strikes me as important.

Alberto Bernabe is a professor of law at the John Marshall Law School. Regular readers will recognize Professor Bernabe as a frequent member of this blog’s #fiveforfriday Honor Roll.  His Professional Responsibility Blog is a fantastic source of information on legal ethics & professional responsibility.

Yesterday, Professor Bernabe posted Tennessee Supreme Court imposes sanctions for improper contingency fee.  The opinion issued on May 13 and is here. The issue: whether a lawyer violated the rules by attempting to collect a fee that was based on a percentage of a settlement offer that the client rejected.

Before I get into the details, let’s review the rules that would apply if the issue arose in Vermont.

  • Rule 1.2(a) requires a lawyer to “abide by a client’s decision to settle a matter.”
  • Rule 1.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing to, charging, or collecting an unreasonable fee;
  • Rule 1.5(c) allows a fee that is contingent upon the outcome of a matter; and,
  • Rule 1.8(i) prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in a client’s cause of action but allows (1) liens authorized by law to secure fees & expenses; and (2) contracts for reasonable contingent fees.

The facts of the Tennessee case:

Client filed a pro se complaint alleging that she’d been injured by the defendant’s negligence. Soon thereafter, Client retained Law Firm.  Client & Law Firm entered into a written fee agreement. Per the agreement, Client would pay Law Firm a contingent fee, plus expenses.  The amount: 40% if recovery were made before an appeal, 45% if recovery made after an appeal.  The fee agreement did not include any language that provided for an hourly fee.  It did, however, include this provision:

  • “Should [Client] refuse to make any settlement which my attorneys advise me is reasonable and should be taken, then I understand that I am responsible for their fee on the basis of that offer, unless they waive this provision.”

Following discovery, the defendant offered $12,500.  Attorney and another at Law Firm advised Client to accept. Client did not.

Attorney moved to withdraw.  In the motion, Attorney also requested a lien in the amount of $13,605 for fees, plus $2,4528.52 for expenses.  The motion asserted that Law Firm had put in 45.35 hours of work at $300 per hour.  The court granted the motion to withdraw but did not rule on the request for a lien.

Eventually, Client filed a disciplinary complaint.  By then, Attorney had filed two additional motions requesting a lien on any recovery.  The final request referenced the fee agreement and sought 40% of the settlement offer that Client had rejected.

At the trial level, a court concluded that Attorney violated Tennessee Rules 1.5(a), 1.5(c), 1.8(i).  The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed and publicly reprimanded Attorney.

Some key points from the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion:

  • the “Settlement Offer Provision” created a fee that was contingent on Attorney recommending that Client accept a settlement offer, but not, as required by the rule, on the outcome of the matter;
  • the so-called “Settlement Offer Provision” was unreasonable in that had an impermissible “chilling effect” on Client’s decision whether to settle;
  • The “Settlement Offer Provision” impermissibly provided Attorney with a proprietary interest in any settlement offer that Attorney recommended Client accept; and,
  • The “Settlement Offer Provision” was unreasonable in that it by recommending that Client accept an offer, “Attorney thereby became entitled to a fee, regardless of whether [Client] accepted the offer and regardless of whether she obtained any recovery whatsoever.”

As noted by Professor Bernabe, Faughnan on Ethics blogged on the opinion here.  Like Bernabe, Faughnan is a terrific resources on professional responsibility.  The post notes:

  • “At its core, this case explains the limits on the ability of a plaintiff’s attorney to try to guard against what happens if their client rejects the attorney’s advice on whether to accept a settlement offer. There do, in fact, have to be limits on the ability to hedge against that because the ethics rules establish explicitly that the decision whether to settle a civil case or not is the client’s decision.”

The post goes on to remind us that, generally, the rules allow lawyers who withdraw “to assert a lien as authorized by statute and pursuant to either the terms of their contract or, perhaps, depending on how things turn out for payment in the form of quantum meruit.”

Again, this is a Tennessee opinion.  It’s worth noting, however, that the rules involved are identical to Vermont’s.






Monday Morning Answers – #129

Happy Labor Day!

Is it hot & humid?  Yes!  But, you have a choice how you respond to the weather.  One choice is to bemoan it & sit on the couch all day.  Another is to smile at the thought of one more day to wear shorts, flip-flops, and to be outdoors!  Maybe even by the grill with a cold beverage . . . on a Monday!

I choose the latter.

Friday’s questions are here.  The answers follow the honor roll.  Also, you’ll recall that I asked readers to share the events seared into their memories.  I did so in the context of Friday being the anniversary of Princess Diana’s passing.  As always with my readers, the response was fantastic and significantly outnumbered entries into the quiz.

The most-cited events were to be expected:

  • 9/11
  • the space shuttle Challenger tragedy

A few others mentioned by at least 3 people:

  • JFK assassination
  • Sandy Hook
  • MLK assassination
  • the moon landing
  • Princess Diana
  • Boston Marathon bombings
  • Barack Obama elected

Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly given the frequent musical references on this blog, many of you will never forget where you were & what you were doing when you learned that a musician died.  Among the musicians whose deaths were mentioned more than once:

  • Kurt Cobain
  • Jerry Garcia
  • John Lennon
  • Jim Morrison
  • Elvis Presley
  • Prince
  • Tupac Shakur

Anyhow, thank you again for sharing. I love your stories.  Alas, to make the honor roll, you’ve got to answer the questions!

Honor Roll

(responses had to include quiz answers to make the honor roll)


Question 1

Lawyer called me with an inquiry.  My response included the following words and phrases:  “knowledge,” “violation,”  “substantial question,”  and “honesty, trustworthiness, fitness.”

What did Lawyer call to discuss?

  • A.  Informing a court that a client had testified falsely in a civil matter.
  • B.  Informing a court that a criminal defense client had testified falsely.
  • C.  Reporting another lawyer’s misconduct.  See, Rule 8.3(a).
  • D.  Whether reciprocal discipline would be imposed in Vermont as a result of Lawyer being sanctioned in another state.

Question 2

The conflicts rules are NOT relaxed for:

  • A.  Lawyers who transfer from one private firm to another.
  • B.  Lawyers who move from government practice to private practice.
  • C.  Lawyers who provide short-term pro bono services under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit or court.
  • D.  All of the above.

Vermont’s rules do not allow for the automatic screening of lateral transfers.  I’ve blogged on that issue here & here.  Later this month, the PRB will consider a rule change that I’ve recommended that would allow a new firm to screen a lateral transfer from another firm.

Our rules allow for screening when a lawyer moves from government practice to private practice.  In addition, Rule 6.5 relaxes the conflicts rules for lawyers who provide short-term pro bono services under the auspices of a program sponsored by a nonprofit or court.

Question 3

You’re at a CLE.   You hear me say:  “yes, it’s okay as long as  (1) your client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to the representation of your client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.”

What did someone ask if it was okay to do?

  • A.  Accept compensation for representing a client from someone other than the client.  See, Rule 1.8(f).
  • B.  Request that guardian be appointed for the client.
  • C.  Represent co-defendants in a criminal matter.
  • D.  Talk to the media in a client’s case.

Question 4

Client provides Lawyer with an advance payment of $2,000.  Lawyer has yet to do any work for Client.

Which is most accurate?

  • A.  The fee agreement must be confirmed in writing.
  • B.  The fee agreement must be confirmed in a writing that is signed by Client.
  • C.  The $2,000 must go into Lawyer’s pooled interest-bearing trust account (“IOLTA”).
  • D.  Lawyer may treat the money as Lawyer’s own if Lawyer confirms in writing (i) that the fee is not refundable; and (ii) the scope of availability or services that Client will receive.    See, Rule 1.5(f) & (g).

Here, A & B are not correct.  The rules do not require standard fee agreements to be reduced to writing.  That being said, I think it’s a bad idea not to.

C is not correct. There’s not enough information in the question to know.  For instance, if the lawyer has complied with Rule 1.5(f) and (g), then the money cannot go into trust.

Many lawyers charge “flat fees” that are “earned upon receipt” and treat the funds as their own upon receipt.  This is ok ONLY IF THE LAWYER COMPLIES WITH RULE 1.5(f) and RULE 1.5(g).  Otherwise, the money must go in trust until earned.

Question 5

Speaking of the JFK assassination . .  .

. . . Jules Mayer was a lawyer in Dallas.  In 1950, Mayer drew up a will for a client.  The will named Mayer as the executor the client’s estate.

The client died in 1967.  A dispute quickly arose, as the client’s family contended that the client had changed his will on his deathbed to remove Mayer as executor.  Mayer refused to make the change and kept the original will.

In 1991, after a lengthy legal battle, a probate court granted the family’s petition to remove Mayer as executor after concluding that he had mismanaged the estate.

Central to the dispute was gun associated with the JFK assassination.  Mayer’s client bought the gun for $62.50.   After winning their legal battle with Mayer, the client’s family sold the gun for $220,000.  Fortunately for the family, Mayer had safeguarded the gun, holding it in trust for 24 years.

Two-part question:

  1. Who was Mayer’s famous client?
  2. Who was the famous victim of the client’s gun?

Mayer’s client was Jack Ruby.  The gun was used on Lee Harvey Oswald.  A story of the gun is in this article in the Las Vegas Sun.

See the source image